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in making the Social World Searle makes the same claim he made in 1995: that 
“human beings along with a lot of other social animals, have the capacity for 
collective intentionality” (Searle 2010, 43). in this paper i aim to show that Searle’s 
“overattribution” of collective intentionality to non-human animals is unjustified. Firstly, 
I briefly reconstruct and augment Tomasello & Rakoczy’s (2007) criticism that Searle 
overemphasises the primitiveness of the notion of collective intentionality. Secondly, i 
will investigate the domain of cooperative behaviour by means of a comparative, cross-
species methodology driven by an enactivist approach. Such an approach can help us to 
understand (i) why Searle overattributes collective intentionality, (ii) how we can resist 
such an overattribution, and (iii) why we ought to resist it. Thirdly, i argue that Searle’s 
six conditions of adequacy for any account of collective intentionality are incompatible 
with his attribution of collective intentionality to non-human animals. finally, i conclude 
by noting that Searle’s overattribution has important consequences for his system, as 
it implicates that human uniqueness begins with institutional reality rather than with 
collective intentionality and social ontology.
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in the Construction of Social reality John Searle claims that “many species of 
animals, our own especially, have a capacity for collective intentionality” 
(Searle 1995, 23). in making the Social World Searle makes the same claim: 
that “human beings along with a lot of other social animals, have the 
capacity for collective intentionality” (Searle 2010, 43). in this paper i 
aim to show that Searle’s “overattribution” of collective intentionality to 
non-human animals is unjustified. My argument comprises four steps. 
Firstly, I briefly reconstruct and augment Tomasello and Rakoczy’s (2007) 
criticism that Searle overemphasises the primitiveness of the notion of 
collective intentionality, and that he does not show enough regard to 
the understanding of the cognitive and communicative resources that 
are demanded by individual behaviour in the context of cooperative 
engagements. here a complementary account is presented, namely the 
distinction between competitive and collaborative cooperation as outlined 
by Brinck and gärdenfors (2001).
Secondly, i will investigate the developmental roots of cooperation in social 
cognition, by means of a comparative, cross-species methodology driven 
by an enactivist approach. the basic claim of the enactivists is that our 
experiences are not inner events, rather that they result as the engagements 
between an organism and the surrounding environment. therefore any 
experience includes aspects of the brain, the body and the environments of 
an organism, in a temporal and spatial extension (hutto 2009). given that 
interactions during ontogeny play an especially large and important role in 
the cognitive development of homo sapiens, as compared with other primates 
(tomasello 2011, 38), such an approach turns out to be very helpful within 
the debate on the nature of the notion of intentionality1. the enactivist 
paradigm has been similarly discussed by psychologists such as tomasello 
himself (Seemann [ed.] 2010), and that is the reason why its exploitation in 
this argumentation can help us to understand (i) why Searle overattributes 
collective intentionality, (ii) how we can resist such an overattribution, and 
(iii) why we ought to resist it.
thirdly, after having recalled Searle’s six conditions of adequacy for any 
account of collective intentionality (Searle 2010, 44-45), i argue that these 
1 thanks to dan hutto, who in a recent conversation inspiringly guided me through a deeper 
analysis of Searle’s notion of intentionality and pointed my attention to its crucial implications 
for my investigations in social cognition.
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conditions are incompatible with the attribution of collective intentionality 
to non-human animals, if we accept tomasello and rakoczy, Brinck and 
gärdenfors and the enactivist’s arguments. in particular i focus on Searle’s 
third and sixth conditions. according to the third condition, intentionality 
- collective or individual - has to exist inside individuals” heads. the sixth 
condition says that in collective intentionality, there is the need to believe 
in sharing one’s collective goal. i explain how these two conditions suggest 
that social coordination and collective intentionality should be identified. 
however, if we identify social coordination and collective intentionality 
then we are led to wrongly attribute collective intentionality also to non-
human animals. Finally, i conclude by noting that Searle’s overattribution 
has important consequences for his system, as it implicates that human 
uniqueness begins with institutional reality rather than with collective 
intentionality and social ontology.
rakoczy and tomasello (2007) have contributed to critically informing the 
necessary distinction between, on the one hand, social coordination, and, on 
the other hand, collective intentionality. they explain why the former can be 
traced in non-human animals” behaviour, meanwhile, the latter is arguably 
human-specific. In order to outline this distinction they provide empirical 
evidence from experimental research on child development, and the way 
infants engage in social activities at different stages of their growth. rakoczy 
and tomasello outline the distinction between these two very different 
kinds of behaviour in order to explain why Searle’s claim that collective 
intentionality can be found not only in human reality, but also in non-human 
animals including our nearest primate relatives, is wrong. the analysis of the 
skills and motivations that constitute collective intentionality (according to 
Searle’s six conditions of adequacy2) has enabled them to hypothesise about 
how, during the course of normal ontogeny3, human children move from 
specific social interactions involving shared intentionality4 (learning, sharing, 
informing, helping) to participation in institutional realities-involving 
scenarios. arguably, rakoczy and tomasello’s distinction between social 
coordination and collective intentionality can be furthered and informed by 
Brinck and gärdenfors’s (2001) notion of cooperation, which distinguishes 
between competitive cooperation and collaborative cooperation, the latter 
being characterised by those features that can be ascribed to rakoczy and 
tomasello’s account on collective intentionality.
2 See section 3.
3 meaning during the course of normal ontogeny (excluding cases of autistic and feral 
children) in which children engage in regular social activities with peers and adults too.
4 For a complete account on the notion of “shared intentionality”, see tomasello et al. (2005).
2.
The Ontogeny of 
Social Ontology- 
Revisited
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the difference between competitive and collaborative cooperation can be 
introduced as follows: non-human primates coordinate individual goals 
into common actions (e.g. group hunting and coalitions against predator’s 
aggressions). in the case of chimpanzees, as it has been remarked, “there 
is nothing that would be called collaboration in the narrow sense of joint 
intentions based on coordinated plans” (rakoczy and tomasello 2007, 116). 
this means that in order to talk about collaboration we need to identify the 
joint intentions that underpin a group activity. a joint intention is directed to 
a goal that will bring benefit to all the members of the group, independently 
from the fact that the single actor will get a personal and immediate 
reward. in fact the way in which chimpanzees work within a group is a 
competitive or agonistic interaction (hare et al. 2000, 2001, 2004). in the 
case of, for instance, group hunting, the participation of single members is 
motivated by the awareness that “we are going to share the plunder”  and 
this is going to happen soon. this, conversely, means that the motivation 
for which each single actor is taking part in a group activity, is driven by 
the desire to satisfy a personal need that will be rewarded immediately or 
in the near future. this kind of group activity is also called “coalition of 
alliances”  that is a context in which single individuals act together in order 
to defend the group they belong to from the attack of other – in this specific 
case, chimpanzee’s – groups. But what is happening in these interactions 
is just a coordinated execution of the same thing at the same time with 
responsiveness to one another’s behaviour, that is the understanding of 
one another’s intentional states (i shall return to this in a moment). on the 
other hand, human children, from very early in ontogeny, tend to engage 
in group activities (this is especially evident in the context of pretend play 
games where the mutual agreement to pretend to be someone else implies 
the predisposition to understand mutuality and trust) that are motivated by 
an interest in the achievement of a shared goal (rakoczy 2006, Wyman and 
tomasello 2007).
the second kind of cooperation, collaborative cooperation, occurs when 
the goal is not to compete for given resources. in this context, the reward 
may be prospective relatively to long-term planning. and the calculus of 
future values of goals demands cognitive tools that all non-human animals, 
including primates, seem to lack. collaborative cooperation is human-
unique (and, ostensibly, the same goes for collective intentionality) in that 
it requires the ability to attribute mental states and to understand mental 
states, which is something that non-human primates are unable to do.
the difference might be that apes do not attribute mental states in order 
to interpret other’s behaviour but they instead attribute only intentional 
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states. generally, intentional states are considered to belong to a subcategory 
of mental states (Searle 1983). in my account, instead, intentional states 
are not included in mental states but are characterised by a different set of 
conditions. i suggest that holding mental states means being aware of the 
contents of one’s own thoughts (and to a further level of sophistication, means 
to be aware to the contents of someone else’s thoughts5). i am not implying 
that non-human animals cannot be in mental states but just that they cannot 
be aware of them – and therefore share them- as they cannot understand 
the content of their mental states (see hutto 2009). and this constitutes a 
significative limitation in the diversification of collective action-planning. 
the reason why – being a human – i can understand my mental states is due 
to the fact that my mind represents the contents of my own thoughts in terms 
of propositional attitudes. and propositional attitudes have a linguistic form. 
But, as pointed out by Searle (1979), intentionality does not need to occur 
exclusively in the form of a linguistic act6. therefore, i characterise intentional 
states as describing intentional actions. By “intentional” i mean driven by 
a purpose or goal-directed. But holding them does not, necessarily, imply 
the mastery of concepts like beliefs and desires (for which there is the need 
of far more complex forms of representations). and it can only work when 
the competition is directed to given resources (e.g. food, mate selection), 
which means on short-term planning. in this sense, my claim is that we 
should ascribe intentionality to all action-oriented and conscious behaviour, 
but we should not, given this assumption, jump to the conclusion that all 
living organisms act intentionally with the same degree of complexity, and 
we should not accept so easily Searle’s claim that many social animals act 
collectively intentionally. as a result, the more an agent’s communicative 
system is sophisticated the more the collaborative framework gets articulated 
in a wider range of possible scenarios. So, it is important to understand the 
crucial relevance of the fact that homo sapiens adopted propositional attitudes 
and not just intentional attitudes. Because the former is what it takes to have 
the capacity for collective intentionality. i shall now enhance the last point by 
means of an enactivist story.
as stated, it is arguable that propositional attitudes are generated 
by symbolic representations, namely taking the shape of linguistic 
communication (Bermùdez 2003, davidson 1984, hutto 2008). But what is 
the content of a symbolic representation? The first thing to point out is 
5 See tomasello et al. (2005) for an account on different orders of intentionality.
6 Unlike Searle (1979) i do not believe that intentional states consists of representative contents 
in the various psychological modes. in my account intentional states can exist without being 
represented linguistically. 
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that not all attitudes involve contents, but, following hutto (2008) it can be 
argued that only propositional attitudes are content-involving, as opposite 
to intentional attitudes, that do not require propositional contents. in this 
account, it is necessary to be able to manipulate complex linguistic forms 
in order to articulate content-full propositional attitudes. this is because 
only language has the appropriate structures that enable to express those 
attitudes.
the content of symbolic representations is what its user wants to represent 
as “standing for something else” than what is perceptually experienced in 
the present context. this is a function that a signals-based communicative 
system – as those we find in non-human animals world – cannot exploit 
in that signals are never used to stand for something else than what is 
required in coordinating behaviour. From a cognitive point of view, it is a 
crucial step up to be able to think by means of “detached” representations 
(gärdenfors 1996) because it is what it, cognitively, takes in order to act 
accordingly to goal-based rather than drive-based motivations (see, for 
instance, Sterelny 2003). representations of mental states make use of 
propositions that are structured with recombinant elements. this is what 
allows voluntary planning, actical reasoning, and decision making. in fact 
this capacity requires the mastery of the tools provided by language. as 
a result, from the enactivist perspective, opositional-based beliefs and 
desires that characterise human’s practical planning, are likely a quite late 
developmental achievement (hutto 2008).
the likelihood of the claim that i just made is widely supported, for what 
concerns the characterisation of competitive cooperation (or social 
coordination) by the results of empirical findings. These experimental 
tasks stress the quite unmistakable competitive attitude that arise in the 
behaviour of chimpanzees when put under specific circumstances. This 
evidence, the results of hare et al. (2000, 2001, 2004), have been referred to 
as the, so-called, competitive cognition hypothesis, which suggests that 
chimpanzees have been demonstrated to be more skilled and motivated 
when engaged in competitive rather than in (collaborative) cooperative, 
cognitive tasks. relatively, instead, to the notion of collaborative 
cooperation (or collective intentionality), carpenter et al. (2005) have 
shown that even very young children (between the age of 1 and 2 years) 
are capable of grasping the role structure of joint actions based – as 
previously explained - on joint intentions. those children demonstrate their 
ability to imitate role reversal by spontaneously acting out the other role 
when appropriate. this means that human children pursue shared “we-
intentions” with others, as they develop an ability to engage in collaborative 
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cooperation as the basic form of collective intentionality, before language 
kicks in. and even though, chimpanzees” communication can be very 
sophisticated, it will always remain at the level of individualistic or 
i-intentionality, lacking the structure of collective or we-intentionality that 
is characterised by the joint attentional frames that typifies human children 
communication, normally, from the age of two years old. in fact, in human 
ontogeny, we observe how children’s communicative experiences occur 
in a very complex social and pragmatic context. We can take as a valuable 
example a developmental phenomenon named “triadic engagement” 
(tomasello et al. 2005) that children begin to experience at around the age 
of 9 and 12 months. this is the social context in which the child becomes 
able to coordinate an interaction that comprehends objects and people 
simultaneously. the triadic engagement consists in a triangulation of 
references by means of symbolisation. in other words, a child learns how to 
direct the attention of someone else to a given object, eparing the ground 
for joint attentions. Joint attentions are possible when there is a mutual 
awareness towards the nature of the object or the event that is the subject of 
the attention.
tomasello (2003) argues that the primary role of symbolic communication is 
that of enabling an individual to manipulate the attention of, or to share the 
attention with, another individual. More specifically, he claims, symbolic 
communication occurs in its complete form when linguistic communication 
becomes referential. this referentiality is what enables the other to share 
attention to some virtually construed entity, that is a symbolic reference 
that stands for a given entity.
this kind of interaction does not occur in non-human primates in that 
their communicative signals are not used to direct the attention of others 
through the conveying of information by means of referentiality. Signal 
references are, rather, used to affect the behaviour of others directly. 
this, in all likelihood means that the evolution of human language itself 
originally arose to satisfy the necessity to influence the behaviour of others, 
and only later in phylogeny, to influence their mental states.
So language is a social entity itself and, therefore, its evolution is driven by 
the needs of its users. language can satisfy humans” greatest need, namely 
that of exploiting a system of heredity linking the generations, and that is 
capable of keeping up with continuous cultural changes. this means that 
if we accept that cultural progress is one of the main distant goals and 
symbolic referential thought is necessary in order to engage in long-term 
goals, therefore we can understand why cultural progress is made possible 
by our capability for symbolisation in linguistics. So if the function of 
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communication in non-human primates is, as tomasello argues, that of 
influencing other’s behaviour, the function of human communication is also 
that of influencing other’s mental states. Because symbolic communication 
is a tool that enables the access to the contents of other’s mental states. and 
as deacon (1997) said, the most effective means for coordinating behaviour, 
that is being able to anticipate another’s mental responses in the context 
of joint activities, requires imagination and this is a uniquely powerful 
tool for social manipulation. the crucial function of a symbolic-based 
communicative system is the ability to mentally represent the contents of 
other minds. deacon explains very clearly what is the role of symbolisation 
in his notion of a shared “virtual mind”: “the ability to use virtual reference 
to build up elaborate internal models of possible futures, and to hold these 
complex visions in mind with the force of the mnemonic glue of symbolic 
inference and descriptive shorthands, gives us unprecedented capacity to 
generate independent adaptive behaviour” (deacon 1997, 427).
it is now time to call back Searle’s characterisation of his notion of collective 
intentionality and then see to what extent it does not match previous 
discussions.
Following Searle (1995, 152) collective intentionality consists in (i) engaging 
in cooperative behaviour, (ii) sharing intentional states (e.g., beliefs, desires, 
intentions), or – as he rephrases it in his 2010’s analysis (Searle 2010,  43) 
- (i.a) having collective intentions in cooperative planning (what he calls 
collective prior intentions) and acting (what he calls collective intentions-
in-action), and (ii.a) holding collective intentions in believing and desiring. 
in order to explain this, Searle (2010, 44-45) has outlined six conditions of 
adequacy that, he believes, any account of collective intentionality has 
to meet. Within these six conditions, recalled as follows, i shall focus on 
the third and the sixth conditions, in that they both clearly appear to be 
counterintuitive relative to Searle’s idea that collective intentionality is not 
human-unique: 
1. We must have a clear distinction between prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action.
2. the conditions of satisfaction of both prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action are causally self-referential.
3. all intentionality, whether collective or individual, has to exist 
inside individuals” heads.
4. in case of collective intentionality, we have to distinguish what 
i can individually cause, that which can be part of the condition 
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of satisfaction of my intentional content, and that which i take 
for granted as contributed by my collaborators in the collective 
intentionality.
5. the propositional content can only represent the condition of 
satisfaction of the intention.
6.  in collective intentionality, it cannot be required of each 
individual’s intentionality that he knows what the intentionality on 
the part of others is. […] all one needs to believe is that they share 
one’s collective goal and intend to do their part in achieving the goal.
having in mind rakoczy and tomasello (2007)’s (enhanced) explanation of 
the reason why is necessary to appreciate the distinction between social 
coordination and collective intentionality, enables us to understand why 
claims such as those made in the third condition, and in the sixth condition, 
cannot apply to collective intentionality if we ought to embrace Searle’s 
position. in fact, to say that collective intentionality has to exist inside 
individuals” heads implies assuming the mastery of rather complex means7. 
in terms of cognitive and communicative demands, it implies the ability to 
grasp the mental states of others, and the contents of those mental states, 
which, as previously stated, are made of propositional attitudes that are 
articulated through a symbolic-based system of reference, namely that of 
language. this does not mean that, necessarily, without language there is 
no collective intentionality, but it means that, necessarily, without those 
pre-linguistic social activities, such as role reversal imitation, that can be 
observed since very early in human ontogeny (tomasello and call 1999, 
tomasello 2003), and that constitutes the normal route to the acquisition of 
a linguistic communicative modality, there is no collective intentionality.
the advantage of embracing an enactive view in order to investigate the 
development of socio-cognitive abilities is that it offers an explanation 
on how the interaction between the agent and its environment (which 
is made of other agents as well) enables the growth of the cognitive and 
communicative skills that we exploit in social cognition. these skills are, 
as i have argued, what make collective intentionality an exclusively human 
business. they are not innate tools, still there is some peculiar reason 
for why humans only can develop them. this is why the mark of human 
cognition might be found in this double mechanism: the first is the capacity 
for sophisticated abstract thought and planning, and the second is the 
capacity to exploit this abilities as social interactive weapons.
7 See section 2.
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Searle’s notion of collective intentionality is inconsistently presented. on 
the one hand, it is claimed to be shared by human and non-human animals, 
and on the other hand is argued to be characterised by behaviours that 
are only permitted by certain human-unique features. as it has been 
explained this notion is an overattribution, for two main reasons: firstly, it 
emphasises its primitiveness8, and secondly, it neglects the cognitive and 
communicative demands of cooperation that the single participants have 
to deal with. it is also incompatible to his six conditions of adequacy. this is 
because, as i have explained, the conditions that he outlines (in particular 
the third and the sixth) cannot apply for an account that puts collective 
intentionality and social coordination, under the same explanatory label. in 
order to appreciate the species-uniqueness that characterises human social 
ontology we should reject Searle’s notion and this is made possible through 
a reinforced version of tomasello and rakoczy’s (2007) criticism that 
takes into account the distinction between competitive and collaborative 
cooperation (Brinck and gärdenfors 2001), and the respective cognitive 
and communicative demands that these two kinds of social behaviour 
require. in addition the enactivist paradigm offers a consistent explanatory 
framework that enables to reinforce the critics to Searle’s argument.
in Summary, collective intentionality is grounded in the ontogenetic roots 
of human social ontology (rakoczy 2008). it is embedded in cooperative 
behaviour described in terms of collaborative cooperation that requires 
communicative modalities (that will become linguistic) that enables social 
learning. So far, there is no other species that share this ontogenetic 
path with us, therefore we cannot accept Searle’s notion of collective 
intentionality, which as he puts it, would, indeed, best be just named, social 
coordination.
8 more on the critique on the primitiveness of collective intentionality in tomasello and 
rakoczy (2007).
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